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the main recent theoretical models and the possible effect that the 
strategy adopted by the Treasury from 1999 onwards could have on the 
base interest rate. The findings show that the public-debt-management 
strategy adopted by Brazil was based on the recommendations of Calvo 
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and the public-debt-to-GDP ratio all play a significant role in determining 
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In the 1980s, public debt in the United States soared, 
giving rise to a debate on fi scal sustainability. This 
did not affect the United States alone: in countries 
such as Belgium, Ireland, and Italy, for instance, the 
public-debt-to-GDP ratio reached 100% or more, with 
debt servicing representing a signifi cant proportion of 
the public budget. Furthermore, the increase in real 
interest rates and the slowdown in economic growth 
looked likely to set the public-debt-to-GDP ratio on a 
dangerous course. 
At the end of the 1980s, most countries had 
undertaken strict budgetary adjustment programmes. 
In 1989, for instance, Germany and the United States 
managed to stabilize the public-debt-to-GDP ratio. In 
the United Kingdom, a major programme was being 
rolled out on the basis of the privatization strategy. 
In some countries, however, the implementation 
of adjustment programs had been unsuccessful in 
promoting fi scal equilibrium.
According to Dornbusch and Draghi (1990), 
the macroeconomic environment in several countries 
during the 1980s raises several questions related to 
fi scal equilibrium:
(i) What is the microeconomic rationale behind a 
government having to choose between an increase 
in debt or fi scal equilibrium?
(ii) Are there macroeconomic implications (effects 
on economic activity, interest rate, etc.) stemming 
from the size of the public defi cit, or the decision 
to fi nance the government through an increase in 
public debt? 
(iii) How do countries deal with their defi cits over time?
(iv) When public debt is high, is there a theoretical 
framework to offer guidance on appropriate 
maturities or indexation of public debt? 
In terms of the fi nal question, several theoretical 
models have been developed on the management of 
public debt. The five main models are: Calvo and 
Guidotti (1990); Giavazzi and Pagano (1990); Barro 
(2003); Missale, Giavazzi, and Benigno (2002); and 
Giavazzi and Missale (2004). 
This debate currently deserves attention in 
developing countries. At the end of 1999, the Brazilian 
Treasury announced a strategy for extending the 
maturity of federal securities, based on models of 
public-debt management put forward by researchers 
such as Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Calvo and 
Guidotti (1990). Furthermore, in an attempt to improve 
the composition of government liabilities, efforts were 
made to increase the share of fi xed-rate and price-
indexed securities and to reduce the share of fl oating-
rate and exchange rate-indexed debt. The main aim is 
to manage debt in a way that increases credibility.
Empirical analysis will be used to evaluate the 
public-debt-management strategy adopted by Brazil. The 
possible effect of the strategy on the base interest rate is 
also analysed. The article is organized into fi ve sections. 
Following this introduction, section II details the main 
characteristics of contemporary models of public-debt 
management (based on relevant publications), section 
III describes Brazilian public-debt management during 
2000-2005, section IV includes an empirical analysis, 




Contemporary models of public-debt 
management 
The theoretical analysis of public-debt management 
received particular attention at the beginning of the 
1990s, thanks to the analysis of Calvo and Guidotti 
(1990) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). Calvo and 
Guidotti (1990) analysed several frameworks for the 
indexation and maturity of public debt in order to 
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study their impact and optimal levels. The authors 
therefore analysed indexation in a framework of two 
periods (0 and 1), where period 0 sees the government 
fully commit the actions of the government in period 
1 (full precommitment). The results indicate that the 
full indexation of public debt is desirable. However, 
full indexation may increase the tax burden as a source 
of public-sector fi nancing. The optimal public-debt-
management strategy therefore lies in longer debt 
maturities and a partial indexation of public debt.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) studied whether it 
is possible to reduce the risk of a crisis of confi dence 
by correctly structuring public-debt maturities. The 
authors define a confidence crisis as an increased 
likelihood of change in the monetary regime, with the 
system in question taken to be a fi xed exchange-rate 
regime. The researchers conclude that the central bank’s 
capacity to resist a confi dence crisis depends largely 
on how successful the Treasury is in refi nancing public 
debt. The risk of monetary-regime change is therefore 
reduced (and the fi xed exchange rate maintained) if the 
average public-debt maturity is increased or if interest 
or amortization payments are smoothed out.
Recently, the debate on the best framework for 
managing public debt was galvanized by the works of 
Missale, Giavazzi, and Benigno (2002), Barro (2003), 
and Giavazzi and Missale (2004). Missale, Giavazzi, 
and Benigno (2002) carried out an empirical analysis 
of how governments choose the maturity term when 
a fi scal stabilization programme is launched. In this 
context, it is assumed that the government aim is 
to achieve a fi scal surplus capable of stabilizing the 
public-debt-to-GDP ratio. For this purpose, 72 cases 
of fi scal stabilization are considered in countries of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) between 1975 and 1998. In each 
case, the governments’ bond-issuance strategies two 
years after the launch of the stabilization plan were 
analysed. The analysis looked at two governments with 
different capacities for cutting expenditure. As a result, 
there are differing expectations as to what the interest 
rate will be at the end of the stabilization plan. 
The analysis by Missale, Giavazzi, and Benigno 
(2002) suggests that governments are more likely to 
increase the maturity of public debt in the face of 
asymmetric information. This is a way of reducing the 
risk of refi nancing and thus increasing the expectation 
that the fiscal effort will be successful. According 
to the authors, a government can issue bonds with 
mainly short-term payments in cases where investors 
are not aware of the government’s for implementing 
the announced policies (presence of asymmetric 
information). The main idea is that this procedure must 
be adopted if the long-term cost is too high in terms 
of future interest-rate expectations. 
Barro (2003) observed that the smoothing of the tax 
burden encourages the government to issue bonds whose 
payment is contingent on expenditure. When expenditure 
is equal in every period, public debt must be structured 
in consolidated annuities (consols). This isolates budget 
constraints from unexpected variations in the market 
prices of indexed bonds with different maturities.
The model put forward by Giavazzi and Missale 
(2004) assumes that the main objective of public-debt 
management in Brazil is to stabilize the public-debt-
to-GDP ratio and thus reduce the probability of a 
crisis. In order to stabilize the public-debt-to-GDP 
ratio, the government must fi nd sources of fi nancing 
that offer low costs and limited variability of returns. 
Therefore, the choice of the public-debt instruments 
involves a trade-off between risk and the expected 
cost of debt servicing. From this point of view, the 
optimal framework of indexed public debt depends on 
a cost and risk assessment. Risk is minimized if an 
instrument offers protection against variations in the 
primary surplus and in the public-debt-to-GDP ratio, 
and if the variation in returns is relatively low. 
It should be pointed out that the models of Missale, 
Giavazzi and Benigno (2002) and Giavazzi and Missale 
(2004) assume that the government’s objective is to 
stabilize the public-debt-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, both 
models analyse the optimal framework for public debt, 
taking into consideration the trade-off between the cost of 
debt servicing and the risk of refi nancing. Nevertheless, 
while the first model evaluates an optimal maturity 
framework for public debt, the second model analyses 
the optimal indexation framework for public debt. On 
the other hand, models such as those put forward by 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990); Missale, Giavazzi and 
Benigno (2002); and Barro (2003) suggest that the 
optimal strategy is to increase the average maturity of 
public debt. In a different way, Calvo and Guidotti (1990) 
take both viewpoints into consideration.
In short, within the literature there are three main 
visions concerning the management of public debt. The 
fi rst, represented by the models of Calvo and Guidotti 
(1990) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), emphasizes 
the dynamic inconsistency of fi scal policy. The second 
vision (Barro, 2003) considers the smoothing of the 
tax burden in a context of exogenous government 
expenditure, in order to identify the optimal framework 
for public debt. The third, as advocated by Giavazzi, 
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Missale and Benigno (2002) and Giavazzi and Missale 
(2004), focuses on the aim of stabilizing the public-
debt-to-GDP ratio. Generally speaking, all these visions 
concur that an increased average maturity of public 
debt and a partial indexation of the debt both constitute 
optimal strategies.
III
Public-debt management in Brazil
This section presents a brief description of public-
debt management in Brazil between the change of the 
exchange-rate regime in January 1999 and December 
2005,1 with special emphasis on three points: the 
public-debt-to-GDP ratio, the structure of public debt 
and the average maturity.
Between January 1999 and December 2005, the 
average public-debt-to-GDP ratio was 53.13%. However, 
between 1999 and 2000 this ratio fl uctuated around 
49.95% (see fi gure 1). Subsequently, debt increased 
substantially and reached 63.62% in September 2002. 
The acceleration of the rise in public debt during the 
second half of 2002 was due to “market fears” about 
a possible victory for Luis Inácio Lula da Silva in the 
presidential elections. A speech in which the candidate 
expressed unorthodox ideas increased the risk perceived 
by investors and triggered a process of rising interest 
rates and currency devaluation. However, the victory 
of this candidate and the establishment of the new 
government in 2003 did not change the course of 
economic policy. As a result, fi scal efforts were stepped 
up to reduce the public-debt-to-GDP ratio, which fell to 
almost 50% at the end of 2005.
The change to a fl oating exchange-rate system 
and the adoption of infl ation targeting in 1999 are 
largely responsible for the trajectory of public debt 
indexed to the interest rate and to the exchange rate. 
Generally speaking, currency devaluation meant that 
it was no longer attractive to use the exchange rate as 
one of the main indexing factors. The use of the interest 
rate, on the other hand, remained a viable option. The 
principal reason is that, with infl ation targeting, the 
main instrument available to the central bank is the base 
interest rate. Hence, the strategy adopted by the central 
bank to promote a disinfl ationary process increased the 
demand for bonds indexed to the interest rate.
1 This analysis is based on several reports of the Brazilian National 
Treasury. For an analysis concerning government debt management 
in the Euro Area, see Wolswijk and de Haan (2005).
In December 1999 the share of fi xed-rate securities 
was 9%, which increased to 15% by the end of 2000. 
This was the result of the Treasury’s strategy to 
gradually reduce the risk of short-term fl uctuations in 
economic variables. However, due to the volatility in 
the domestic fi nancial market in 2001, the proportion 
of fi xed-rate securities in the public debt fell (to stand 
at 1.91% in April 2003). In that period, the Treasury 
needed to choose between increasing the level of 
fi xed-rate securities at the cost of increasing the risk 
of refinancing, or accepting the reduction of such 
securities in the public-debt composition and extending 
debt maturities (i.e. lengthening the debt profi le). The 
Treasury decided to reduce the volume of short-term 
fi xed-rate securities. 
In 2002, with the aim of improving the debt 
composition, the Treasury adopted a strategy based 
on Assets and Liabilities Management (ALM) that 
emphasized the need to replace bonds indexed by 
the interest rate (over/SELIC) and the exchange rate 
with price-indexed papers. However, the proportion 
of interest-rate indexed bonds in the public debt 
composition increased to 60.8% in December 2002. 
On the other hand, the proportion of exchange-rate 
indexed bonds decreased and that of price-indexed 
bonds increased (see fi gure 2). The main reason for 
this pattern was currency devaluation and the fact that 
index-price performance exceeded the expectations of 
economic agents.
In 2003, 2004 and 2005 public-debt management 
was based on the strategy announced in 2002. In other 
words, the aim was to gradually reduce the proportion of 
exchange-rate indexed bonds and interest-rate indexed 
bonds, and to increase the share of public debt made 
up by fi xed-rate and price-indexed bonds. The strategy 
was partially successful: it considerably increased the 
proportion of fi xed-rate securities and price-indexed 
bonds, and reduced the share of exchange-rate indexed 
bonds to a negligible level. Nevertheless, the proportion 
of interest-rate indexed bonds stabilized at a high level 
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Public Debt – Composition by Indexing Factor
Source: The Treasury, Brazil.
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(51.77% in December 2005), and remains the main 
form of indexation for public debt. This highlights the 
fact that the market has still not completely eliminated 
the risk of refi nancing crises.
The Treasury did attempt to smooth the maturity 
structure of public debt. The average maturity of 
public debt increased from 27.13 months to 36.23 
months between January 1999 and August 2001, and 
remained relatively stable until May 2002 (see fi gure 3). 
Subsequently, the average maturity trended downwards 
due to a lack of confi dence on the domestic market. 
The maturity of the public debt in January 2006 (28.76 
months) was lower than the average in 1999-2006 
(30.78 months) and was close to the level observed in 
1999. In short, the strategy adopted by the Treasury 
fell short of guaranteeing a sustainable increase in the 
average maturity of public debt. 
Thus, the profi le of Brazilian public debt gradually 
improved during the period under analysis. However, 
the public-debt-to-GDP ratio is still too high (51.65% 
in December 2005), which makes it diffi cult to control 
infl ation and signifi cantly reduce the base interest rate 
(over/SELIC).2 The problem is particularly serious for 
the Brazilian economy because it has experienced a low 
economic growth rate in the period under analysis.
2 The SELIC rate is the weighted average of the rates traded in 
overnight repurchase agreements (repos) backed by government 
bonds registered in the Special System of Clearance and Custody 
(SELIC). The terms SELIC, over/SELIC and base interest rate will be 
used interchangeably from hereon in.
FIGURE 3
Public Debt – Average Maturity
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This section presents empirical evidence using the 
application of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the 
vector autoregressive model (VAR) to analyse the 
relationship between the public-debt-to-GDP ratio and 
the main variables that explain the profi le of Brazilian 
public debt. The main objective is to use the models 
described in section 2 to identify the theoretical basis 
for the strategy adopted in Brazil between December 
1999 and December 2005.
The data used in this analysis are monthly and 
consist of the following variables:
(i) Public-debt-to-GDP ratio (DEBGDP): variations in 
this variable are crucial for the analysis because 
they refl ect any action taken to manage the public 
debt. As pointed out by Givazzi and Missale 
(2004), this is the most important variable for 
countries where fi scal vulnerability makes debt 
stabilization the main goal of debt management.
(ii) Public-debt composition: this variable is very 
important for public-debt management because 
any increase in the public-debt-to-GDP ratio is 
positively related to the indexing factor of public 
debt. In the case of Brazil, the main indexing 
factors are: the over/SELIC rate - which is the 
base interest rate of the economy (SELINDEX), 
the exchange rate (EXCINDEX) and the price 
index (PRICINDEX). Furthermore, based on 
the proportion of each indexing factor in the 
composition of public debt, a regressor entitled 
INDEX was created to represent the proportion of 
public debt associated with a given indexing factor. 
Fixed-rate securities (FRS) are also considered in 
the analysis. 
(iii) Average maturity of public debt (AMPD):3 this 
variable is expected to correlate strongly with 
public debt. For instance, according to Giavazzi 
and Pagano (1990), increasing public-debt 
maturity makes it possible to reduce the number of 
bonds that need to be refi nanced during a crisis.
(iv) Securities held by the public to mature in 12 
months (SHP): this variable is a proxy for the 
concentration of maturities of public debt. 
According to Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), the 
3 The Treasury began this series in February 2000.
concentration of maturities is a major factor in 
the central bank’s ability to resist a confi dence 
crisis.
(v) Primary surplus: this variable represents the 
government effort to balance public fi nances. In 
this sense, increases in the primary surplus must 
reduce the level of public debt.
A fi rst step in the empirical analysis is to examine 
the stochastic process in the series over time, i.e. to 
verify the integration order of the series. This procedure 
eliminates spurious results from the estimation of 
models. Therefore, unit-root tests were carried out 
(Augmented Dickey-Fuller –ADF– and Phillips-
Perron –PP). The results, in both tests, show that the 
all the series under analysis are I(1) (see tables A1 
and A2).4
The above-mentioned results suggest that it would 
be appropriate to use the fi rst difference of series in the 
regression. However, this procedure can imply a loss 
of relation among series in the long run. It is therefore 
necessary to assess whether a linear combination among 
series is stationary, even if individually series are non-
stationary. In other words, it is vital to check if series 
are cointegrated because, in that case, the regression of 
original series would imply reliable statistics. 
1. Estimation of models
(a) Model 1
The fi rst model captures the idea of Calvo and 
Guidotti’s (1990) model of public-debt management. 
Their model suggests that lengthening the maturity 
terms, together with an adequate level of public-debt 
indexation, constitutes a good strategy for ensuring 
the credibility of economic policy and thus stabilizing 
the public-debt-to-GDP ratio. The theoretical model 
therefore considers a regressor related to public-debt 
indexation and another related to the average maturity of 
public debt. The model to be tested is expressed as:
DEBGDP = f (SELICINDEX, EXCINDEX, PRICINDEX, AMPD) (1)
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While it is not possible to identify the expected 
signs for the relations with public debt indexation 
ex-ante, the expected sign for average maturity is 
∂ f / ∂AMPD<0. 
The cointegration test proposed by Johansen 
(1991), based on the signif icance of estimated 
eigenvalues, indicates that the trace statistic rejects the 
no-cointegration hypothesis at a signifi cance level of 
5%, but does not reject the hypothesis that there is more 
than one cointegration relation (see table A3). Given 
that series are cointegrated and that there is therefore 
a relation of long-run equilibrium among them, the 
equation (1) can be estimated with the original series 
without the problem of spurious results. 
The results of equation 2 indicate that fi nancing 
public debt using bonds indexed by price, the interest 
rate or the exchange rate results in an increase in public 
debt. Contrary to theoretical expectations, lengthening 
the maturity terms also increases the public-debt-to-
GDP ratio.5
5 It should be pointed out that the number of lags in the equation 
was based on the Schwarz criterion.
DEBGDP =  (2)
0.0251 + 0.2971SELINDEX(-6) + 0.1344PRICINDEX(-6) + 0.0747EXCINDEX(-6) + 0.0102AMPD(-6) 
(0.5813) (5.1122) (0.9372) (0.0747) (6.9825)
 R2 = 0.7740 DW = 1.080979 n = 67
Serial Correlation Test
F-statistic 9.548393 Prob. F(2,60) 0.000251
Obs*R-squared 16.17619 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.000307
Heteroskedasticity Test
F-statistic 1.255561 Prob. F(14,52) 0.266603
Obs*R-squared 16.92660 Prob. Chi-Square(14) 0.260110
Note: t-statistics between parentheses.
Since the number of degrees of freedom is higher 
than 20 and the level of signifi cance is 0.05, the null 
hypothesis must be rejected if the t-statistics are higher 
than 2 in modules. In this case, only SELINDEX and 
AMPD are statistically signifi cant. The R2 reveals that 
77% of the variation of the public debt can be explained 
by the variables present in the model. Furthermore, the F-
statistic indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that all 
slope coeffi cients are equal to zero at the 5% level. With 
a view to testing the serial correlation in the residuals, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic (1.08) was used to show 
the presence of positive autocorrelation. The presence 
of serial correlation was confi rmed by the Breusch-
Godfrey test. In order to check the heteroskedasticity of 
residuals, a White test was carried out and the presence 
of heteroskedasticity was detected.
Due to the presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity in the regression, the model was 
re-estimated by applying the Newey-West matrix. The 
new regression (equation 3) shows that the coeffi cients 
of SELINDEX and AMPD are once again statistically 
signifi cant at the 0.05 level. Therefore, it is observed 
that the empirical evidence does not concur with the 
theoretical analysis of Calvo and Guidotti (1990).
DEBGDP =  (3)
0.0251 + 0.2971SELINDEX(-6) + 0.1344PRICINDEX(-6) + 0.0747EXCINDEX(-6) + 0.0102AMPD(-6) 
(0.5806) (5.1589) (0.6905) (0.8189) (4.6120)
 R2 = 0.7740 DW = 1.080979 n = 67
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(b) Model 2
The second model considers the analysis of 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). Therefore, the variables 
used in the regression are: AMDP, SHP and the primary 
surplus (PS). The justifi cation for using the primary 
surplus variable its that it is capable of reducing the 
public-debt-to-GDP ratio. Since the Johansen test shows 
that the hypothesis of the non-cointegration of series 
is accepted at the 0.05 level of signifi cance (see table 
A3), the empirical model is:
D(DEBGDP) = f (D(AMPD),D(SHP),D(PS)) (4)
with the following expected signs for the relations 
expressed through partial derivatives: ∂f/∂D(AMPD)<0, 
∂f/D(SHP)>0, ∂f/∂D(PS)<0.
The result indicates that lengthening the maturity 
terms of public debt, generating a primary surplus and 
increasing the concentration of public-debt maturities 
increases the public-debt-to-GDP ratio. However, 
even though the results reveal that any coefficient 
has statistical signif icance, the F-statistic is not 
signifi cant, and the Durbin-Watson statistic (2.5735) 
indicates the presence of negative autocorrelation 
(equation 5). The Breusch-Godfrey test confi rms the 
presence of autocorrelation at 0.05 level of confi dence. 
Furthermore, the White test reveals the problem of 
heteroskedasticity in the regression.
 D(DEBGDP) = 0.0005 + 0.1530D(SHP) + 0.0024D(PS) + 0.0080D(AMPD) (5)
 (0.2685) (1.2018) (0.6063) (0.7448)
 R2 = 0.0271 DW = 2.5735 n = 72
Serial Correlation Test
F-statistic 5.784035 Prob. F(2,66) 0.004846
Obs*R-squared 10.73768 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.004660
Heteroskedasticity Test
F-statistic 1.753743 Prob. F(9,62) 0.095738
Obs*R-squared 14.61008 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.102219
Note: t-statistics between parentheses.
The results do not have statistical signifi cance. 
Therefore, they cannot be used to interpret the 
implications of this model for the management of 
Brazilian public debt.
(c) Model 3
This model incorporates the idea from models of 
Giavazzi, Missale and Benigno (2002) and Barro (2003). 
Although the motivations in these models are different, 
the result is the same, namely that lengthening the 
maturity terms of public debt is an effective strategy for 
public-debt management. In this context, the regression 
considers the public-debt-to-GDP ratio as a dependent 
variable and AMPD as a regressor. The Johansen test 
indicates that the series are not cointegrated (see table 
A3). Therefore, the fi rst difference of the series was 
considered in the regression: 
D(DEBGDP) = f (D(AMPD)), ∂ f /∂D(AMPD)< 0 (7)
The expected result is a negative relation between 
the lengthening of maturity terms of the public debt 
Based on the above-mentioned results related 
to model 2, it was again necessary to correct the 
estimation using Newey-West matrix. The result is:
 D(DEBGDP) = 0.0005 + 0.1530D(SHP) + 0.0024D(PS) + 0.0080D(AMPD) (6)
 (0.2685) (1.2018) (0.7448) (0.6063)
 R2 = 0.0271 DW = 2.5735 n = 72
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and the public-debt-to-GDP ratio. Although the result 
indicates the presence of the expected negative relation, 
neither the t-statistic nor the F-statistic is signifi cant. 
Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic, the Breusch-
Godfrey test and the White test indicate the presence 
of heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation. 
 D(DEBGDP) = 0.0004 – 0.0005D(AMPD) (8)
 (0.2260) (-0.1907) 
 R2 = 0.0005 DW = 2.6476 n = 72
Serial Correlation Test
F-statistic 5.642419 Prob. F(2,68) 0.005406
Obs*R-squared 10.24797 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.005952
Heteroskedasticity Test
F-statistic 0.017126 rob. F(2,69) 0.983024
Obs*R-squared 0.035724 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.982296
Note: t-statistics between parentheses.
In order to reduce the problem detected with 
heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation, the 
Newey-West matrix was applied to give the following 
result:
 D(DEBGDP) = 0.0004 – 0.0005D(AMPD) (9)
 (0.2731) (- 0.1634) 
 R2 = 0.0005 DW = 2.6476 n = 72
The results indicate that lengthening maturity 
terms cannot be the only strategy considered when 
analysing public-debt management in Brazil.
(d) Model 4
This model is based on the theoretical analysis 
of Giavazzi and Missale (2004). In this approach, the 
composition of the public debt by indexing factor is 
essential to public-debt management. Therefore, the 
empirical model is:
DEBGDP = f (SELINDEX, EXCINDEX, PRICINDEX) (10)
The Johansen test indicates rejection of the 
hypothesis of non-cointegration at the 0.05 level, 
which in turn implies that the estimation must be made 
without series differentiation. The result suggests that 
fi nancing public debt using the indexing factors under 
consideration causes an increase in the public-debt-
to-GDP ratio (equation 11). The t-statistics and the F-
statistic are statistically signifi cant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 DEBGDP = 0.2281 + 0.1976(SELINDEX) + 1.1189(PRICINDEX) + 0.4465(EXCINDEX) (11)
 (6.1190) (3.0961) (8.8699) (9.9757) 
 R2 = 0.6498 DW = 0.6404 n = 73
Serial Correlation Test
F-statistic 31.47047 Prob. F(2,67) 0.000000
Obs*R-squared 35.35982 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.000000
Heteroskedasticity Test
F-statistic 2.226087 Prob. F(9,63) 0.031566
Obs*R-squared 17.61357 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.039931
Note: t-statistics between parentheses.
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Nevertheless, both the Durbin-Watson statistic 
and the Breusch-Godfrey test reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no serial autocorrelation. The White 
test reveals no presence of heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals. Using the Newey-West matrix to correct the 
autocorrelation problem in the regression generates the 
following result:
 DEBGDP = 0.2281 + 0.1976(SELINDEX) + 1.1189(PRICINDEX) + 0.4465(EXCINDEX) (12)
 (3.1203) (1.6719) (6.5161) (5.8611)
 R2 = 0.6498 DW = 0.6404 n = 73
Based on the results of the above four models and 
considering R2 as a criterion for selecting the adequate 
model, the best explanation for Brazilian public-debt 
management is found to be model 1.
2. Effect of public-debt management on the 
interest rate
The analysis included in the previous section shows 
that the model based on Calvo and Guidotti (1990) is 
the best match for the Brazilian case. It is therefore 
important to ascertain the effects of a strategy to 
manage public debt by extending the maturity of federal 
securities. Furthermore, it is also vital to consider the 
strategy announced at the end of 1999 to improve the 
composition of government liabilities by increasing the 
proportion of fi xed-rate and price-indexed securities, 
and reducing the share of fl oating-rate and exchange-
rate-indexed debt. 
Besides the traditional argument of Sargent and 
Wallace (1981) that high debt and a large defi cit could 
push up the interest rate, a concentration of redemptions 
is not appropriate due to the high cost it would entail 
in the event of a crisis of confi dence. Even if there 
is sufficient demand for public bonds, the adverse 
environment may bring about an increase in the risk 
premium. Broadly speaking, an average maturity of 
public debt that is short (or long) may be associated 
with a high (or low) interest rate due to the high (low) 
default risk. 
The base interest rate (over/SELIC) is fundamental 
to any analysis of Brazilian public debt. Between 
February 2000 and June 2005, an average 57% of 
federal public bonds were indexed by the over/SELIC 
rate. It is important to note that the Brazilian economy 
suffered several shocks in this period (stock-market 
instability and company losses in the United States, the 
crisis in Argentina and a speculative episode during the 
Brazilian presidential elections, etc.) that resulted in a 
failure to meet infl ation targets in most cases (except 
in 2000 and 2004). As a result, the Treasury was forced 
to reduce the maturity of public debt and pay a risk 
premium in keeping with market demand. Therefore, 
the recent period has been marked by a certain rigidity 
in terms of reducing the short-term interest rate.
Although the literature on public-debt management 
suggests that it is appropriate to extend average debt 
maturity, this is known to come at the cost of a higher 
interest rate in economies lacking credibility. It is 
therefore necessary to establish whether the strategy 
adopted by the Brazilian government in November 
1999 infl uenced patterns in the base interest rate. In 
order to assess the effects of the above-mentioned 
strategy, a vector autoregression (VAR) has been 
carried out using monthly data (February 2000-June 
2005) on the average maturity of public debt (AMPD), 
base interest rate (SELIC), proportion of SELIC-indexed 
securities (DEBINDEX) and the net public-debt-to-GDP 
ratio (DEBGDP), as collected by the Treasury and the 
central bank.
Based on unit-root tests (Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP)) and the correlogram 
analysis of series, the series that were not stationary 
were differentiated as usual (see table A4 and fi gure 
A1). The VAR order was chosen on the basis of 
Schwarz and Hanna-Quinn criteria (see table A.5). 
The best model was found to be the one with two lags. 
According to the results of the Granger causality test 
(see table A6), the appropriate order of series in the VAR 
is given by DEBINDEX, DEBGDP, AMPD and SELIC. 
As the data used are monthly, table 1 shows the 
variance decomposition during the fi rst 12 months. 
The same period is used for impulse-response analysis 
(fi gure 4). According to table 1, the main variable that 
explains the variance of the DEBINDEX is the SELIC. 
Furthermore, the effect from DEBINDEX, DEBGDP and 
AMPD cannot be considered negligible. In relation to the 
impulse-response analysis, an increase in DEBGDP and 
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Months DEBINDEX DEBGDP AMDP SELIC DEBINDEX DEBGDP AMDP SELIC
 1 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 21.24768 78.75232 0.000000 0.000000
 2 96.12370 0.548506 0.070362 3.257435 20.35500 77.37194 1.044210 1.228842
 3 88.75164 1.938671 0.137191 9.172497 22.19732 74.39889 1.775024 1.628759
 4 79.61383 3.934707 0.341600 16.109870 23.61782 71.97437 2.629931 1.777879
 5 70.08112 6.494912 0.744171 22.679800 25.11833 69.89977 3.363887 1.618018
 6 61.21069 9.376426 1.400784 28.012100 26.39971 68.09051 4.025889 1.483891
 7 53.49525 12.405370 2.322360 31.777020 27.43824 66.29889 4.597992 1.664886
 8 47.10612 15.407520 3.485837 34.000530 28.18081 64.38233 5.092001 2.344862
 9 42.00308 18.246190 4.839272 34.911460 28.64143 62.30412 5.518081 3.536366
 10 38.04516 20.817080 6.314428 34.823340 28.87721 60.13637 5.894771 5.091652
 11 35.05080 23.053550 7.838196 34.057450 28.97471 58.00493 6.243172 6.777184
 12 32.83436 24.925200 9.343047 32.897380 29.02146 56.03551 6.583174 8.359860
 AMPD SELIC
Months DEBINDEX DEBGDP AMDP SELIC DEBINDEX DEBGDP AMDP SELIC
 1 0.045657 0.192932 99.76141 0.000000 3.801453 0.009787 0.790343 95.39842
 2 0.778571 2.248934 96.67985 0.292648 2.178402 0.017220 0.469151 97.33523
 3 2.060256 2.107929 95.28145 0.550367 1.268569 0.149315 0.241378 98.34074
 4 2.682422 2.648740 93.80588 0.862955 0.769177 0.417978 0.157037 98.65581
 5 3.267876 3.142126 92.55247 1.037530 0.567184 0.847052 0.259898 98.32587
 6 3.628730 3.823221 91.44420 1.103845 0.641838 1.432912 0.583220 97.34203
 7 3.855810 4.582652 90.47320 1.088343 0.991108 2.160451 1.146940 95.70150
 8 3.965667 5.414534 89.57918 1.040623 1.603879 2.992243 1.948685 93.45519
 9 3.996434 6.274359 88.73238 0.996830 2.443098 3.868523 2.952911 90.73547
 10 3.975144 7.133281 87.91835 0.973226 3.436800 4.712257 4.086191 87.76475
 11 3.924048 7.965808 87.14221 0.967930 4.483481 5.444579 5.245283 84.82666
 12 3.858583 8.756080 86.41586 0.969480 5.472444 6.005445 6.319608 82.20250
Source: Authors’ estimates.
SELIC contributes to a durable increase in DEBINDEX. 
On the other hand, an increase in AMDP is capable of 
reducing debt indexation. This result suggests that the 
extension of debt maturity is the result of credibility 
considerations, with reduced public demand for a 
high proportion of public debt to be indexed to the 
interest rate.
Public debt plays a fundamental role in the 
performance of DEBGDP. Besides this, indexation is 
relevant to variance decomposition and is capable of 
promoting a decrease in debt. This result needs to be 
clarifi ed. As pointed out by Calvo and Guidotti (1990), 
indexation is a useful strategy for reducing public 
debt. However, using interest rate as the main index 
factor is not a good choice because, when there is a 
lack of credibility, an increase in indexation implies a 
reduction in debt maturity. Furthermore, the positive 
effects are only short term, as the cost of public debt 
service continues over time.
Although variance decomposition indicates that 
neither AMDP nor SELIC are relevant to debt variance, 
the data generated by impulse-response analysis should 
not be ignored. An increase in AMDP brings down 
public debt, while an increase in the interest rate raises 
debt after the sixth month. Therefore, the combined 
effect of a longer public debt maturity and lower 
interest rate may be to promote a fall in debt.
An analysis of AMDP reveals that average maturity 
is the main variable to explain variance and that an 
extension of debt maturity is not eliminated over time. 
Although DEBGDP has little signifi cance in the variance 
of AMDP, as predicted by the theories, an increase in 
DEBGDP tends to reduce the maturity of public debt. 
The relative importance of DEBINDEX and SELIC in the 
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FIGURE 4
Impulse-response
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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variance of AMDP, as in the impulse-response analysis, 
shows that the external shocks to these variables do not 
have statistical signifi cance.
In terms of SELIC variance, the main variable is 
the SELIC itself. The other variables together account 
for approximately 18%. The impulse-response analysis 
reveals that a shock transmitted by DEBINDEX brings 
down the interest rate after the fi fth month. Similarly, 
a shock transmitted by AMDP, contributes to a 
permanent decrease in SELIC after the fourth month. 
These results indicate that public-debt management 
that seeks to decrease debt stock and extend average 
debt maturity helps to bring down the base interest 




Empirical evidence suggests that Brazil adopted 
a public-debt-management strategy based on the 
recommendations of Calvo and Guidotti (1990). The 
average maturity and stock of public debt are relevant 
to the amount of SELIC-indexed securities. Furthermore, 
the results indicate that the average maturity of public 
debt, the proportion of SELIC-indexed securities and the 
net public-debt-to-GDP ratio play an important role in 
determining the Brazilian base interest rate. 
Another relevant fact is that, although indexation 
reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio, this strategy is not 
appropriate for an economy with insuffi cient credibility, 
due to the high cost of public debt service. Therefore, 
the government should endeavour to extend the 
maturity of public debt and reduce any adverse effect 
on the interest rate. Furthermore, given the extremely 
high interest rate and the short maturity of public debt 
in Brazil, the strategy of generating primary surpluses 
has yet to yield positive results.
The strategy of extending the maturity of public 
debt announced by the Brazilian government at the 
end of 1999 is the right approach. However, according 
to Wolswijk and de Haan (2005, p. 19) “this new 
environment required an adaptation of strategies. 
Very practical considerations regarding cost and risks 
continue to dominate the objectives adopted, rather than 
tax or defi cit stabilisation as suggested in the academic 
literature”. As pointed out by Sargent and Wallace 
(1981), an economy that does not have sufficient 
credibility to neutralize shocks and that has a high 
debt-to-GDP ratio can generate a real interest rate that 
is higher than the economic growth rate. This concurs 
with Calvo and Guidotti (1990), who draw attention 
to the fact that a strategy of extending the maturity of 
public debt for economies with a debt-to-GDP ratio 
above 50% implies a high cost due to the increase in 
the interest rate. 
It is important to stress that fi xed-rate debt avoids 
large interest payments when the SELIC rate rises during 
a crisis or reacts to negative supply shocks (Giavazzi 
& Missale, 2004). However, in an economy such as 
Brazil’s, where the maturity of fi xed-rate bonds remains 
relatively short, the benefi ts of a fall in interest rates are 
negligible. This emphasizes the importance of reducing 
the proportion of public debt indexed to the interest rate 
and increasing infl ation-indexed debt, for instance.
(Original: English)
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Series Lag Test Critical values 1% Critical values 5%
EXCINDEX 0 -1.5303 -2.5974 -1.9453
D(EXCINDEX) 0 -6.7300 -2.5979 -1.9454
SHP 1 -2.6615 -3.5256 -2.9029
D(SHP) 0 -5.2898 -2.5979 -1.9454
DEBGDP 1 0.1151 -2.5979 -1.9454
D(DEBGDP) 0 -11.8064 -2.5979 -1.9454
INDEX 3 -0.7176 -2.5989 -1.9455
D(INDEX) 2 -2.7292 -2.5989 -1.9455
PS 0  0.8879 -2.5974 -1.9453
D(PS) 0 -8.2902 -2.5979 -1.9454
AMPD 1 0.0480 -2.5979 -1.9454
D(AMPD) 0 -6.2564 -2.5979 -1.9454
PRICINDEX 0  1.9278 -2.5974 -1.9453
D(PRICINDEX) 0 -8.4058 -3.5256 -2.9029
SELINDEX 0 -0.4879 -2.5974 -1.9453
D(SELINDEX) 0 -7.6033 -2.5979 -1.9454
FRS 3 0.3476 -2.5989 -1.9455
D(FRS) 7 -4.0700 -4.1079 -3.4815
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Note: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) – the fi nal choice of lag was made based on the Schwarz criterion (SC). No-constant specifi cation 
or time trend was used for series D(DEBGDP), DEBGDP, D(SHP), D(EXCINDEX), EXCINDEX, D(PS), PS, D(SELINDEX), SELINDEX, PRICINDEX, 




Series Lag Test Critical values 1% Critical values 5%
EXCINDEX 4 -1.3393 -2.5974 -1.9453
D(EXCINDEX) 3 -6.7357 -2.5979 -1.9454
SHP 4 -0.9566 -2.5974 -1.9453
D(SHP) 2 -5.2984 -2.5979 -1.9454
DEBGDP 1 -1.9423 -3.5242 -2.9023
D(DEBGDP) 0 -11.8064 -2.5979 -1.9454
INDEX 5 -1.3002 -2.5974 -1.9453
D(INDEX) 5 -8.5988 -2.5979 -1.9454
PS 2 0.9238 -2.5974 -1.9453
D(PS) 3 -8.2913 -2.5979 -1.9454
AMPD 0 -1.8567 -4.0906 -3.4734
D(AMPD) 3 -6.2913 -2.5979 -1.9454
FRS 6 1.2483 -2.5974 -1.9453
D(FRS) 6 -7.9343 -2.5979 -1.9454
PRICINDEX 2 2.0541 -2.5974 -1.9453
D(PRICINDEX) 2 -8.4084 -3.5256 -2.9029
SELINDEX 3 -0.4753 -2.5974 -1.9453
D(SELINDEX) 3 -7.5926 -2.5979 -1.9454
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Note: Phillips-Perron test – lag is the lag truncation chosen for the Bartlett kernel. No-constant specifi cation or time trend was used for series 
D(DEBGDP), SHP, D(SHP), D(EXCINDEX), EXCINDEX, D(PS), PS, D(SELINDEX), SELINDEX, PRICINDEX, INDEX, D(INDEX), D(AMPD), FRS 
and D(FRS). Constant was used for the series DEBGDP and D(PRICINDEX). Constant and time trend were used for the series AMPD. 
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TABLE A3
Johansen Cointegration Test
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value Prob.**
Model 1
None *  0.431613  90.133850  69.818890  0.0005
At most 1 *  0.267025  49.457240  47.856130  0.0351
At most 2   0.215673  27.090880  29.797070  0.0994
At most 3  0.109833  9.600017  15.494710  0.3128
At most 4  0.016844  1.223073  3.841466  0.2688
Model 2
None   0.289991  46.485160  47.856130  0.0669
At most 1   0.166373  21.826800  29.797070  0.3082
At most 2  0.111015  8.724999  15.494710  0.3914
At most 3  0.003500  0.252436  3.841466  0.6154
Model 3
None  0.184701  16.462700  20.261840  0.1539
At most 1  0.024151  1.760242  9.164546  0.8248
Model 4
None *  0.306547  56.785930  47.856130  0.0058
At most 1 *  0.231001  30.428710  29.797070  0.0422
At most 2  0.138665  11.516800  15.494710  0.1816
At most 3  0.010627  0.769249  3.841466  0.3804
Source: Estimates calculated by the authors using the Johansen cointegration test.
Note:
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level.  
** MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values.
TABLE A4
Unit root tests (ADF and PP) - VAR
 ADF PP
Series Lag Test Critical  Critical Lag Test Critical Critical
   values 1% values 5%   values 1% values 5%
AMPD 0 -0.333129 -2.601596 -1.945987 1 -4.392240 -4.107947 -3.481595
D(AMPD) 0 -6.932854 -2.602185 -1.946072    
SELIC 1 -3.420096 -3.538362 -2.908420 5 -0.236942 -2.601596 -1.945987
D(SELIC)     3 -2.774981 -2.602185 -1.946072
DINVINDEX 0 -0.333129 -2.601596 -1.945987 3 -0.322813 -2.601596 -1.945987
D(DIVINDEX) 0 -6.932854 -2.602185 -1.946072 3 -6.904872 -2.602185 -1.946072
DEBGDP 1  0.075217 -2.602185 -1.946072 1  0.040130 -2.601596 -1.945987
D(DEBGDP) 0 -10.72096 -2.602185 -1.946072 2 -10.55005 -2.602185 -1.946072
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Note: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) – the fi nal choice of lag was made based on the Schwarz criterion (SC). No-constant specifi cation 
or time trend was used for all series except SELIC whose constant was used. Phillips-Perron test – lag is the lag truncation chosen for the 
Bartlett kernel. No-constant specifi cation or time trend was used for all series except AMPD whose constant and time trend were used. 
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FIGURE A1
Evolution and correlogram of the seriesa
Source: Treasury and central bank of Brazil.
a AC = autocorrelation, PAC = partial autocorrelation. The figures 1 to 21 indicate the number of lags. The ordinates record the 
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TABLE A5
AIC, SIC and HQ criteria for VAR
 VAR with constant no constant
 Order SIC HQ SIC HQ
 0 22.43041 22.34540  
 1 15.18016 14.75511 15.18027 14.84023
 2 14.89359* 14.12851* 14.75558* 14.07551*
 3 15.42656 14.32144 15.35733 14.33722
 4 15.90623 14.46108 16.02932 14.66918
 5 16.47140 14.68622 16.53693 14.83675
Source: Authors’ estimates on the basis of the Schwarz (SIC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criteria.




 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
   DSELIC does not Granger Cause DAMPD 62 0.15207 0.85927
   DAMPD does not Granger Cause DSELIC  0.40028 0.67200
   DDIVINDEX does not Granger Cause DAMPD 62 0.55802 0.57544
   DAMPD does not Granger Cause DDIVINDEX  0.03362 0.96696
   DDEBGDP does not Granger Cause DAMPD 62 1.02862 0.36404
   DAMPD does not Granger Cause DDEBGDP  0.16018 0.85237
   DDIVINDEX does not Granger Cause DSELIC 62 0.74929 0.47730
   DSELIC does not Granger Cause DDIVINDEX  7.63111 0.00116
   DDEBGDP does not Granger Cause DSELIC 62 2.82503 0.06763
   DSELIC does not Granger Cause DDEBGDP  1.20975 0.30581
   DDEBGDP does not Granger Cause DDIVINDEX 62 0.86605 0.42607
   DDIVINDEX does not Granger Cause DDEBGDP  2.41721 0.09826
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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